Skip main navigation
We use cookies to give you a better experience, if that’s ok you can close this message and carry on browsing. For more info read our cookies policy.
We use cookies to give you a better experience. Carry on browsing if you're happy with this, or read our cookies policy for more information.

Summary of Week 5

During the Cold War period, Soviet natural gas supply to Western Europe was stable even as US-Soviet tensions were high.

In the 1990s-2000s, the European Commission pushed for the liberalization of gas market and electricity markets through three stages. The year 2009 was a turning point after which Russia’s unfair gas prices and other contractual characters such as long-term contracts, Take-or Pay, and destination clauses began to weaken with the deepening of US shale gas revolution.

It is unlikely that EU member states will soon converge politically on a truly shared gas vision and integrated gas market in Europe.

Russia’s strategic partners and client countries in Europe have an interest in resisting gas market integration. A case in point is the recent signing of Nordstream 2 between Russia and Germany. From Russia’s standpoint, the issue of energy security in EU–Russia energy relations is overwhelmingly oriented towards security of supply.

There is a distinct lack of a conception of energy security as security of exports and demand. Gazprom might consider a strategy to flood Europe with cheap gas in 2016 to kill off US LNG. Gazprom can produce and export gas to Europe at a much lower cost than LNG from across the Atlantic, and this approach would mirror Saudi Arabia’s strategy of keeping oil production elevated in order to protect market share.

Share this article:

This article is from the free online course:

Global Resource Politics: the Past, Present and Future of Oil, Gas and Shale

Hanyang University

Contact FutureLearn for Support